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Abstract
WeinvestigatetheinterdependenceofthedefaultriskofseveralEurozonecountries(France,
Germany, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain) and their domestic banks during the pe-
riod June 2007 - May 2010, using daily credit default swaps (CDS). Bank bailout programs
changed the composition of both banks’ and sovereign balance sheets and, moreover, affected
the linkage between the default risk of governments and their local banks. Our main ﬁnd-
ings suggest that in the period before bank bailouts the contagion disperses from bank credit
spreads into the sovereign CDS market. After bailouts, a ﬁnancial sector shock affects more
strongly sovereign CDS spreads in the short-run, however, the impact becomes insigniﬁcant at
a long horizon. Furthermore, government CDS spreads become an important determinant of
banks’ CDS series. The interdependence of government and bank credit risk is heterogeneous
across countries, but homogeneous within the same country.
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1“The scope and magnitude of the bank rescue packages also meant that signiﬁcant risks had
been transferred onto government balance sheets. This was particularly apparent in the market
for CDS referencing sovereigns involved either in large individual bank rescues or in broad-based
support packages for the ﬁnancial sector.”
(BIS, December 2008, p.20)
1 Introduction
During the recent ﬁnancial crisis extraordinary measures were taken by central banks and gov-
ernments to prevent a potential collapse of the ﬁnancial sector that threatened the entire economy.
However, the effects on the interdependence of the ﬁnancial and the sovereign sector were widely
unknown. Gray (2009, p.128) argues that “regulators, governments, and central banks have not
focused enough on the interconnectedness between ﬁnancial sector risk exposures and sovereign
risk exposures and their potential interactions and spillovers to other sectors in the economy or
internationally”. The lack of theoretical macroeconomic models that are able to incorporate con-
tagion mechanisms between government and ﬁnancial sector ampliﬁed the uncertainty related to
implications of government interventions. Nevertheless, regulators and policy makers need to
understand the complex dynamics of the risk transmission in order to be able to formulate effec-
tive policies and to be aware of the risk transferred from the ﬁnancial sector to governments. This
paper proposes a framework to investigate in detail the interdependence of banks’ and sovereign
credit risk in the Eurozone. Our setup highlights the important changes that occurred due to bank
bailouts.
As pointed out by Gray et al. (2008), using arguments from the contingent claims analysis
(CCA)1, there are several channels linking the banking and sovereign sector, which are impacted
on by implicit as well as explicit guarantees. A systemic banking crisis can induce a contraction
of the entire economy, which weakens public ﬁnances and transfers the distress to the govern-
ment. This contagion effect is ampliﬁed when state guarantees exist for the ﬁnancial sector. As
a feedback effect, risk is further transmitted to holders of sovereign debt. An increase in the cost
of sovereign debt leads to a devaluation of the government debt that impairs the balance sheets
of banks that hold these assets. Acharya et al. (2011) have recently used the term “two-way feed-
back” to describe these interdependencies. The authors construct a novel theoretical framework
to model the link between bank bailouts and sovereign credit risk. In our paper, we empirically
study this feedback effect and show how the linkage between the sovereign and ﬁnancial sector
was affected during the recent turmoil period.
The interconnectedness through balance sheets of governments and banks has been described
in the context of the ﬁnancial crisis in other recent empirical studies. For instance, Gerlach et al.
1This approach is based on Merton’s and Black-Scholes’(1973) option pricing work. It can also be employed for
measuring the sovereign-banks interaction, taking into account the implicit and explicit contingent liability for the
ﬁnancial system.
2(2010) ﬁnd that as a consequence of macroeconomic imbalances, especially for peripheral Euro-
pean countries (e.g. Greece, Ireland), a jump in sovereign bond and credit default swap (CDS)
spreads is transmitted from the banking sector. The authors claim that systemic and sovereign
risk became more interwoven after governments issued guarantees for banks’ liabilities. This re-
sult is supported by Ejsing and Lemke (2011) who argue that the sensitivity of sovereign CDS
spreads to the intensifying ﬁnancial crisis increases after the bailout of the ﬁnancial sector. Dieck-
mann and Plank (2010) present evidence for a private-to-public risk transfer in the countries where
governments stabilized the ﬁnancial system after the Lehman Brothers’ event as well. Banks’ and
sovereign CDS became closely linked: ﬁnancial institutions holding important amounts of gov-
ernment debt and states bearing vital contingent liabilities for the ﬁnancial system. Furthermore,
Acharya et al. (2011) provide empirical evidence for the interconnection of ﬁnancial and sovereign
sector credit risk implied by bailout programs. Our study contributes to the literature in three
ways: ﬁrst, relying on previous studies that emphasize the importance of the domestic ﬁnancial
sector as a determinant of sovereign CDS spreads, we provide detailed empirical evidence for its
inﬂuence during the ﬁnancial crisis. Second, in contrast to other studies, we research on the credit
risk interdependence of banks and governments during the last turmoil. Using this approach we
highlight stark alterations of the latter linkage after bank bailouts. Third, we contrast differences
in the private-to-public risk transfer both within a country but also across the Eurozone.
In more detail, we study the lead-lag relation between government’s and bank’s default risk
with a focus on the effect of bank bailouts in the midst of the recent ﬁnancial crisis. First, we
research whether prior to government interventions an increase in the default risk of banks and
states originates mainly from the ﬁnancial sector. Second, we assess if public contingent liabilities
to the ﬁnancial sector affected government’s default risk. In tandem, this study examines whether
defaultriskofthebankingsectorisinﬂuencedbythesovereigndefaultrisk. Finally, weinvestigate
the following two questions: i) Does the perceived degree of a bank’s participation in a national
rescue scheme inﬂuence its dependency on the development of the sovereign spread? ii) Are
country-speciﬁc bailout characteristics reﬂected in the impact of government bailout programs?
Methodologically, we consider the relationship between government and banks’ CDS spreads,
as they provide a proxy for the default risk.2 We conduct this analysis by applying the theory
of cointegration, Granger-causality, and impulse responses to daily CDS series, which are able to
capture changes in the dynamic relation between government and bank credit risk. We consider
sovereign CDS from seven EU member states (France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Por-
tugal, and Spain) together with a selection of bank CDS from these states. We divide the analyzed
period, i.e. June 2007 until May 2010, into before and after bank bailout programs.
Our main ﬁndings suggest: in the period preceding government interventions the contagion
from bank credit spreads disperses into the sovereign CDS market. This ﬁnding can be inter-
preted as evidence for the systemic feature of the recent ﬁnancial crisis. The default risk spills
over from the ﬁnancial system to the entire economy and questions the government’s capacity to
2The objective of this paper is not to investigate the accuracy of this proxy. Our research design takes this link as
given, even though there might have been distortions in this proxy during the last turmoil.
3repay its liabilities. After government interventions, due to changes in the composition of both
banks’ and sovereign balance sheets, we ﬁnd an increased importance of the government CDS
spreads in the price discovery mechanism of banks’ CDS series. Furthermore, a ﬁnancial sector
shock affects more strongly the sovereign CDS spreads in the short-run, however the impact be-
comes insigniﬁcant at a long horizon. Based on the bank’s dependency on future government aid,
we are able to capture differences and similarities in the outcome of bank bailouts within the same
country. Lastly, our cross-country analysis reveals noticeable differences in the outcomes of state
interventions.
From a policy perspective, our results imply an elevated ﬁnancing cost for countries with con-
tingent liabilities for the ﬁnancial sector and a higher volatility in sovereign yield spreads. In
assessing the total cost of bank bailouts, governments need to include extra interest payments
due to augmented spreads. Furthermore, the banking system is sensitive to the health and the
credibility of the support of the host country.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss studies related to our research.
Section 3 presents our hypotheses, the data, our sub-sample selection procedure, and the method-
ology. In Section 4 we present our results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our study contributes to, at least, two strands of literature: on the one hand to the literature that
investigates the determinants of bond and CDS spreads, especially in the midst of the ﬁnancial
crises. On the other it is related to the analysis of the effects of bank bailouts on the credit risk of
governments and banks.
Tied to the ﬁrst strand and relying on a structural model, Schweikhard and Tsesmelidakis
(2009) conclude that credit and equity markets decoupled during the ﬁnancial turmoil. They ﬁnd
support for the “too-big-to-fail” hypothesis, as some companies’ debt holders beneﬁted from gov-
ernment interventions and a shift of wealth from taxpayers to the creditors took place after the
bailout programs. During the crisis some other factors might have inﬂuenced CDS prices (e.g.
counterparty or liquidity risk). Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) ﬁnd that credit spreads are mostly
driven by a systematic factor; however they are not able to identify it. Berndt and Obreja (2010)
study determinant factors for European corporate CDS and identify the common factor, that ex-
plains around 50% of the variation, as the super-senior tranche of the iTraxx Europe index, referred
to as “the economic catastrophe risk”. Similar to our study, Dieckmann and Plank (2010) ﬁnd evi-
dence for a private-to-public risk transfer for the countries with government interventions in the
ﬁnancial system. By employing panel regressions the authors analyze the determinants of changes
in sovereign CDS spreads and ﬁnd that both domestic and international ﬁnancial systems bear an
important role in explaining the dynamics of the CDS spreads. They also argue that countries in
the European Monetary Union (EMU) are more sensitive to the health of the ﬁnancial system than
non-EMU countries. Fontana and Scheiche (2010) identify the main determinants of the bond and
4CDS spreads. They include in the set of explanatory factors proxies for market liquidity and global
risk appetite and these are found to be signiﬁcant. Furthermore, they employ a lead-lag analysis
for bond and CDS markets and ﬁnd that for France, Germany, Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium
the cash market dominates, while for Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal the CDS market
is more important in terms of price discovery. Hull et al. (2004) and Norden and Weber (2004)
analyze the impact of unique events on CDS markets, such as credit rating announcements. The
latter studies ﬁnd that markets anticipate both news and reviews for downgrade and that credit
rating announcements contain important information and have a signiﬁcant effect especially on
the CDS market.
Furthermore, there are studies that solely investigate the sovereign bond market. Using a
GARCH-in-mean model, Dötz and Fischer (2010) analyze the EMU sovereign bond spreads and
ﬁnd that the implied probability of default reached unprecedented values and the increased ex-
pected loss component made some sovereign bonds to loose their status of “safe haven” invest-
ment. Gerlach et al. (2010) analyze the determinants of Eurozone sovereign bond spreads. They
show that the size of the banking sector has an important explanatory value for the changes in
bond spreads, suggesting that markets perceive countries with an important stake of this sector
at higher risk of stepping up and rescuing the banks. Employing a dynamic panel Attinasi et al.
(2009) highlight the main factors that explain the widened sovereign bond spreads in some Euro-
zone countries for the period that covers the core part of the ﬁnancial crisis in Europe.
Within the second strand of literature, Ejsing and Lemke (2011) investigate the co-movement
of CDS spreads of Eurozone countries and banks with a common risk factor, i.e. the iTraxx CDS
index of non-ﬁnancial corporations. The authors ﬁnd that government bailout and guarantee
programs for the ﬁnancial sector induced a drop in the credit spreads for banks but a jump in
governments’ CDS spreads. Furthermore, sovereign CDS series became more sensitive to the
commonriskfactor, whilebanks’CDSspreadsless. Besidesprovidingamodelfortheinterrelation
of bank and government credit risk, Acharya et al. (2011) outline empirically the same mechanism:
a widening of the sovereign and a decrease in bank CDS spreads. Focusing on the ﬁnancial crisis,
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) ﬁnd that bank CDS spreads are signiﬁcantly impacted by
the deterioration of public ﬁnance conditions. A high sovereign debt burden impairs the ability to
provide support for the ﬁnancial sector and too-big-to-fail banks might transform into too-big-to-
be-saved.
3 Hypotheses, Data, and Econometric Methodology
3.1 Hypotheses
Inthissubsectionwedevelopthehypothesestobetestedinourstudy. Firstlywedescribethemain
transmission channels that emerge when either a (systemic) banking crisis develops or sovereign
distress appears. Based on Acharya et al. (2011), Gray (2009) and IMF (2010), we present both
directions of the contagion mechanism.
5If a ﬁnancial institution faces funding and/or liquidity issues, this can trigger a sharp rise in
its default risk and may have speciﬁc contagion effects: (I) the bank cannot pay its obligations
to another ﬁnancial counterparty which in turn can set off funding/liquidity difﬁculties for the
latter and increases its perceived default risk; (II) the state might intervene in order to prevent
bankruptcy of banks. This private-to-public risk transfer augments the probability of default for
the state and lowers the default risk of the ﬁnancial institution. If (I) occurs, difﬁculties within the
entire ﬁnancial system (e.g. systemic banking crisis) might arise and translate into a contraction
of the economy, which also weakens public ﬁnances (e.g. a decrease in the present value of taxes)
and, thus, the sovereign default risk increases.
In the case of a country’s distress, in the ﬁrst wave, the contagion to other entities can be trig-
gered via three direct channels (Chapter 1. of IMF (2010)): (i) from the affected state to other coun-
tries that are highly interconnected through bilateral trade, or share similar problems (e.g. public
deﬁcit, funding needs, etc.); (ii) from the distressed country to domestic banks as the market value
of government bonds held by these banks decreases, and government support loses credibility;
(iii) from the impaired state to foreign banks, that hold important government (or banks) bonds
(or other assets) from the affected country.
Before government interventions, we argue that ﬁnancial sector issues had a systemic compo-
nent, leading to contagion mechanism (I). Thus, the rising default risk of banks had an indirect
effect on governments’ credit risk. Additionally, state interventions in response to ﬁnancial sector
problems were possibly expected by market participants. Thus, the perceived sovereign default
risk increased but was considered of limited importance for having a visible impact on banks’
default risk.
Hypothesis 1. Prior to state interventions, changes in the default risk of banks affect the default risk of
European governments, but not vice-versa.
After government interventions, states do not only bear an asset exposure to the banking sec-
tor but their balance sheets contain contingent liabilities (e.g. government guarantees) as well.
Thus, the sensitivity of government default risk to the banking sector risk is expected to increase.
Furthermore, through the credibility of government contingent liabilities, changes in government
default risk directly impact on the perceived risk of ﬁnancial institutions.
Hypothesis 2 (a). In the period after government interventions, changes in the default risk of banks
affect the sovereign default risk stronger than before.
Hypothesis 2 (b). After bailout programs, an increase/decrease in sovereign default risk affects the de-
fault risk of the domestic banks in the same direction.
Some banks received direct capital injections from their governments. In case that capital in-
jections were sufﬁcient we expect the dependency on future bailouts to be the same as for the rest
of the ﬁnancial sector. On the other hand, in case of a partial recapitalization or any other insufﬁ-
cient interventions, the respective bank should be highly sensitive to the health and credibility of
6the host government. The following hypothesis links the sensitivity of banks’ default risk to the
probability of a future government support.
Hypothesis 3. The bank sensitivity to the sovereign default risk increases with the bank’s reliance on
future government aid.
Our last hypothesis compares the outcome of bailout programs in different countries. The
dimension of different support measures utilized by each country was heterogeneous among the
analyzed Eurozone countries. This was induced by, at least, three factors: i) the economic health
of the country, ii) the size of its ﬁnancial sector relative to the total economy and iii) the exposure
of the banking sector to the systemic crisis.
Hypothesis 4. Heterogeneity of bailout programs across European countries translates into asymmet-
ric interdependence between sovereign and banks’ default risk.
The model introduced by Acharya et al. (2011) describes in detail this feedback mechanism, i.e.
how ﬁnancial sector and government default risk are linked. The authors present a three period
model, in which a ﬁnancial and corporate sector produce jointly aggregate output. There exists a
potential underinvestment problem. Bank bailouts are used to better this problem in the ﬁnancial
sector. Theframeworkpredictsthatbankbailoutsincreasesovereigncreditrisk. Thelatterimpacts
the ﬁnancial sector as the value of guarantees and bond holdings decreases. This linkage implies
a post-bailout increase in the co-movement of government and ﬁnancial sector risk of default.
3.2 Bailout Speciﬁc Characteristics
In order to compare the selected countries we relate our analysis to speciﬁc bailout schemes pro-
vided in each country. Hence, we look at the magnitude of different support measures utilized by
each country, while additionally considering the particular aid for each bank. Following Stolz and
Wedow (2010), we categorize the general set of measures emphasizing the differences and similar-
ities across countries. Even though there is a discrepancy in the number and types of institutions
involved in the banking crisis management, there is less variation across countries in what types
of support measures were applied. The ﬁnancial aid programs can be classiﬁed into four broad
categories: capital injections, guarantees for bank liabilities, asset support programs, and deposit
insurance (see Table 1).
Based on the ratios of total commitment to GDP, the selected countries can be ranked (from
high to low): Ireland, Netherlands, Germany, Spain, France, Portugal, and Italy. Furthermore, the
set of countries can be clustered into three groups: Ireland (high commitment - above 75% of the
GDP); Netherlands, Germany, Spain, France (medium commitment - between 20% - 75% of the
GDP); Portugal and Italy (low commitment - below 20% of the GDP).
7Table 1: Government Support Measures to Financial Institutions (October 2008 - May 2010)
Country Capital injection Liability guarantees Asset support Total commitment Deposit insurance
Guaranteed Other
Within Outside issuance of guarantees, Within Outside as %
Schemes Schemes bonds loans Schemes Schemes 2008 GDP in EUR
France 8.3 (21) 3 134.2 (320) 0 - (-) - 18% 70,000
Germany 29.4 (40) 24.8 110.8 (400) 75 17 (40) 39.3 25% Unlimited
Ireland 12.3 (10) 7 72.5 (485) 0 8 (90) - 319% Unlimited
Italy 4.1 (12) - - (-) 0 - (50) - 4% 103,291
Netherlands 10.2 (20) 16.8 54.2 (200) 50 - (-) 21.4 52% 100,000
Portugal - (4) - 5.4 (16) 0 - (-) - 12% 100,000
Spain 11 (99) 1.3 56.4 (100) 9 19.3 (50) 2.5 24% 100,000
Note: All amounts are in billions of EUR, except for the last two columns. Figures (in brackets) denote totally committed funds and
ﬁgures (outside brackets) are utilized amounts up to May 2010. “Within schemes” refer to a collective bailout program that can be
accessed by any bank that fulﬁlls the requirements for that particular aid scheme. “Outside schemes” refer to individually tailored aid
measures (ad-hoc schemes). Source: Stolz and Wedow (2010)
3.3 Data and Sub-Sample Selection
We use daily CDS spreads collected from Datastream3, for seven European countries together with
two banks from each country, i.e. in total 21 institutions: France (FR), BNP Paribas (BNP), So-
ciété Générale (SG), Germany (DE), Commerzbank (COM), Deutsche Bank (DB), Italy (IT), Intesa
Sanpaolo (ISP), Unicredito (UCR), Ireland (IR), Allied Irish Banks (AIB), Bank of Ireland (BOI),
Netherlands (NL), ABN Amro Bank (ABN), ING Group (ING), Portugal (PT), Banco Comercial
Portugues (BCP), Banco Espirito Santo (BES), and Spain (SP), Banco Santander (BS), Banco Bilbao
Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA). The selection of bank and sovereign CDS series was restricted by data
availability. In order to maintain a homogeneous framework, i.e. the same number of banks while
achieving the longest time frame, we were able to use only two bank CDS series for each country.
All banks are important ﬁnancial institutions, with most of them belonging to the iTraxx Europe
index (8 out of 14). In terms of CDS spreads we decided to use contracts on senior unsecured debt
with 5 years maturity, as they are the most liquid ones.
Brieﬂy, a CDS is a bilateral agreement that transfers the credit risk of a reference entity, which
can be a corporation, a sovereign, an index, or a basket of assets that bears credit risk, from the
“protection buyer” to the “protection seller”. The former party pays a periodic fee to the latter
party (the credit-risk taker), and in return is compensated in case of default (or similar credit
event) of the underlying entity, with a payoff.4 The CDS spread represents the insurance premium
and is paid quarterly until either the contract ends or at the arrival of a credit event (e.g. default).
CDS markets are intensively used as a proxy for credit risk.
Our sample covers the time span from 1 June 2007 until 31 May 2010 and includes 772 ob-
servations of daily data for each of the selected series.5 Prior to the econometric analysis, we
3We downloaded CDS data from Datastream, which in turn is provided by Credit Market Analysis (CMA).
4In the case of cash settlement only the difference between the par value of the bond (notional amount of the loan)
and its recovery value when the credit event occurs is paid in cash by the protection seller. In the case of physical
settlement the par value is paid in exchange for the physical underlying bond.
5In the case of Ireland the sample starts on 4 October 2007 because of inconsistencies with the data obtained from
Datastream.
8log-transform the CDS levels as suggested by Forte and Pena (2009). We further motivate this step
by relatively low levels of the CDS of the sovereign CDS spreads in the ﬁrst stages as compared to
the last stages (wide data range).
Our aim is to analyze the linkages between bank’s and sovereign CDS series in a two sub-
period setup: 1.) before and 2.) during and after bank aid schemes. In order to capture other
structural breaks, we follow BIS (2009) and divide the entire time span into six stages.6 We group
theﬁrst two stages(i.e. Stage1+2) toformthesub-period beforegovernmentinterventionsandthe
last three stages (i.e. Stage 4+5+6) to constitute the sub-period during and after bank aid schemes.
Stage 3 is regarded as a period of market adjustments and it is neglected. When issues concerning
structural breaks appear in our stability analysis (see Section 3.4 and Appendix B), we analyze
stages in combinations (i.e Stage 4+5, Stage 5+6) or individually.
The ﬁrst stage runs from June 2007 until mid-March 2008 and contains 203 observations. This
period is characterized by ﬁnancial stress which has been triggered by fears of losses due to US
subprime mortgage loans and spillovers to European banks (e.g. IKB Deutsche Industriebank,
BNP Paribas). The second stage emerges in March 2008 with the liquidity shortage of Bear Stearns.
This time span consists of 126 observations and ends in mid-September 2008 with the collapse of
Lehman Brothers. BIS (2009) deﬁnes the third stage from mid-September until late October 2008.
This stage includes only 30 observations and we exclude it from our analysis. In this period,
ﬁrst government policy measures are taken. E.g. UK authorities intervene in an attempt to re-
lief the “pressure on ﬁnancial stocks through a suspension of short selling” (BIS, 2009, p.27) on
some ﬁnancial products. Additionally, coordinated actions of major central banks try to control
the situation. The fourth stage is deﬁned from late October 2008 to mid-March 2009 and contains
98 observations. This period is marked by concerns about a deepening of the global recession.
By issuing guidelines7 for European states, the European Commission gives green light for bank
bailout programs. Stage 5 starts in mid-March 2009 when the ﬁrst signs of recovery appear. An-
nouncements of central banks concerning balance sheet expansions, the range, and the amount
of assets to be purchased lead to a signiﬁcant relief of ﬁnancial markets. The ﬁfth stage ends on
30 November 2009, right before the inception of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. This stage
includes 143 observations. Stage 6, the last one in our sample, begins in December 2009 and ends
in May 2010. It consists of 172 observations. This period is driven by concerns about the European
sovereign debt. In May 2010, European governments set up a rescue fund for aiding Eurozone
countries in trouble.
6BIS (2009) covers only our ﬁrst ﬁve stages, starting with 1 June 2007 until 31 March 2009 when Stage 5 emerges. For
the time span that was not included in the latter study we deﬁne a sixth stage. The last stage is selected to start based
on developments in the sovereign CDS market at the end of 2009.
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93.4 Econometric Methodology
In order to analyze the dynamics of the short- and long-run interdependency between the selected
CDS series, this study employs a bivariate vector error correction (VEC)8 and bivariate vector
autoregressive (VAR) framework. Besides interpreting the cointegration relations, we additionally
conduct tests on Granger-causality and consider impulse responses in order to describe the entire
dynamics between the CDS spreads.
We conduct our analysis by considering two main sub-periods: before and during/after gov-
ernment bailouts. Results from the Granger-causality and impulse response analysis are reported
for these two periods. Only the study of the long-run relations, i.e. using the VEC framework,
makes use of further sub-samples if required.9 Impulse responses are obtained using the VEC
framework if available for the two main periods. If tests do not clearly indicate that there ex-
ists a long-run relation, we obtain the impulse responses from a VAR with variables modeled in
log-levels. Thus we do not cancel the dynamic interactions in levels as opposed to modeling vari-
ables in differences and leave the dynamics of the series unrestricted, i.e. we follow an “agnostic”
approach. Granger-causality tests in this paper refer to Wald tests on lag augmented VARs as
proposed by Dolado and Lütkepohl (1996). This test is chosen as it guarantees the validity of the
asymptotic distribution of the test statistic even when there is uncertainty about the cointegration
properties and stationarity of the variables.
For a global view on the interrelations of the series we employ generalized impulse responses
(GIR) as proposed by Pesaran and Shin (1998). Routinely, the analysis of impulse responses is car-
ried out via the application of the Cholesky decomposition. However, the researcher has to specify
some causal ordering of the variables. In our case, a theory which deﬁnes such ordering is hard
to justify, especially in the context of daily data. Based on this argument, we decide to use GIR
because no ordering is necessary and contemporaneous relations are allowed for. One can regard
GIR as the effects of a shock in the structural error of the variable that is ordered ﬁrst in the sys-
tem of orthogonalized impulse responses. To model the uncertainty around our point estimates
of impulse responses we apply the recursive-design wild bootstrap as described in Gonçalves and
Kilian (2004). This bootstrap technique delivers valid conﬁdence bands in the case of conditional
heteroskedasticity. We simulate the 95% conﬁdence intervals using 2000 replications. The gener-





























where (j;k) is the variance related to the error of variable j;k (again j;k 2 (Sov;Bk)) and n
denotes the period after which the impulse has occurred. n represents the matrix of the vector
8During tranquil times we believe that the CDS series of the ﬁnancial as well as government sector are stationary.
However, during times of market turmoil we argue that both CDS series (i.e. bank and sovereign CDS) are impacted
by the same stochastic trend, because both are linked by channels as expressed in Subsection 3.1.
9See Appendix B for further information
10moving average coefﬁcients at lag n, which can be calculated in a recursive way from the VAR
coefﬁcient matrices. It is worth emphasizing that, as we deal with possibly cointegrated VAR
models, the effects of shocks may not die out asymptotically (Lütkepohl, 2007, pp.18-23,263). For
example,  Sov
Bk (n) denotes the response of the sovereign logCDS to a shock in Bk n periods ago.
The exact interpretation of the impulse responses follows the usual reading for semi-elasticities.
E.g. taking into account that 0 = IK, an impulse in variable j in period 0 means a unit increase
in the structural error that leads to an increase of the respective CDS series by 
1=2
(j;j)%. In order
to enable more easily a comparison of the results across banks and countries, we standardize
each series of impulse responses, i.e. the responses caused by the same shock are divided by the
standard deviation of the impulse variable. In the example above, our responses would be divided
by 
1=2
(j;j), so that the initial response of the j-th variable to its own shock is equal to 1 or 100% of the
initial shock of size one standard deviation. Responses can, thus, be interpreted as percentages of
the initial shock in the impulse variable.
In the following the VEC and VAR model setup is discussed. In our setup, i.e. with a sovereign
CDS spread (in short ’Sov’) and a selected domestic bank CDS spread (in short ’Bk’), a VECM with





















where cdsj;t with j 2 (Sov;Bk) refers to logCDSj;t, i.e. the logarithmized CDS series of the
country or bank. cdsj;t denotes the ﬁrst differences of cdsj;s. 0 is a (restricted) constant, and
ut is assumed to be wn(0;u)11.  coefﬁcients portray the short-run dynamics. In contrast, the
 coefﬁcients describe the long-run relationship between banks and sovereign log-CDS spreads.
Sov is normalized (i.e. Sov = 1) and only Bk is estimated. The loading coefﬁcients, , measure
the speed of adjustment at which a particular CDS adjusts to the long-run relationship.12
















where  is a vector of intercepts and the s refer to the respective VAR coefﬁcients.13
10We use the notion of p   1 lags, to remind of the fact that a VECM(p   1) has a VAR(p) representation.
11wnstandsfor“whitenoise”andreferstoadiscretetimestochasticprocessofseriallyuncorrelatedrandomvariables
with the above mentioned ﬁrst two moments.
12For further details on the interpretation of the long-run relations in a VEC framework, please see Appendix B.
13The Granger-causality test (e.g. the bank does not Granger-cause the government CDS series if and only if the
hypothesis H0 : SovBk;i = 0 for i = 0;:::;p cannot be rejected) in this paper is carried out on a VAR with p + 1 lags.
114 Results
This section presents the results for long-run and short-run relationships and, in addition, consid-
ers generalized impulse responses. First, the cross country analysis is presented and second we
report speciﬁc results for three countries. In Appendix A, Table 3 shows the results of all countries
for Granger causality tests, Table 4 outlines the results from our cointegration analysis and Table
5 summarizes the generalized impulse responses for all countries.
4.1 Cross-Country Analysis
The results of the impulse response analysis underline the change in the interdependence of Euro-
pean sovereign CDS spreads and bank CDS spreads. As we are analyzing CDS spreads in levels,
our responses in the long horizon (after 22 days) report whether a long term change in the respec-
tive CDS series occurs due to a shock in either the sovereign or ﬁnancial sector. Table 2 shows the
percentage of the long-run responses that are reported to be signiﬁcantly/insigniﬁcantly different
from zero after 22 days.
Table 2: Percentage of Signiﬁcant/Insigniﬁcant Responses in the Long-Run (After 22 days)
Bank ! Country Country ! Bank
Before During/After Before During/After
Signiﬁcant 100% 21.43% 14.29% 100%
Insigniﬁcant 0% 78.57% 85.71% 0%
Note: Signiﬁcant/Insigniﬁcant refers to evaluating a 95% conﬁdence interval estimated using a recursive-design wild bootstrap with
2000 replications. The left side of the table concerns the country responses to a banking sector CDS shock. The right side refers to
banks responses to a sovereign CDS shock. “Before” concerns the period preceding banking sector bailouts and “During/After” the
period during and after government interventions.
Comparing the periods before and after, one can observe the pronounced effects of the risk
transfer mechanism. The ratio of signiﬁcant bank-responses to a sovereign shock increases from
14.29% before to 100% after interventions. In contrast, the percentage of signiﬁcant country-
responses to a banking sector shock decreases from 100% before to 21.43% after bank bailouts.
The banks, for which we still ﬁnd signiﬁcant responses after bailouts are the Portuguese banks
and one Italian bank (Intesa Sanpaolo). In the period before, there is a stark contrast between the
result that all banks are found to impact its sovereign CDS series and only a very small fraction of
the countries affect bank CDS spreads. We argue that the roots of this ﬁnding are in the systemic
component of the crisis that originated from ﬁnancial institutions and spilled over to the sovereign
CDS market. In the period after, the picture changes completely: the effects of a sovereign shock
becomes permanent to bank CDS spreads, while banking sector shocks are less important than
before. As emphasized in other recent papers, these ﬁndings are the effect of the private-to-public
risk transfer.
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Figure 1: Effects of a Banking Sector Shock on Government Spreads: Before Government Interventions
Note: Sources of the banking shock are written in parentheses. Shocks in banks spreads within the same country have very similar
impactonthesovereignspreadintheperiodbeforegovernmentinterventions. Oneofthetwobankresponsespercountryaredepicted
as results are similar. The “Average” line represents the mean of the sovereign responses from a shock in the seven bank CDS spreads.
into two groups: INNER composed by FR, DE, NL (with responses above the “Average” line) and
OUTER that consists of IR, IT, SP, PT (with responses below the “Average” line). The results for the
INNER group can be argued by a weak interest (i.e. low liquidity of the CDS contracts) in insuring
against the default of these countries in the period before Lehman Brothers’ collapse. This could
have led ﬁrst to a market inefﬁciency and then followed by a strong adjustment effect, as the
volume increased. Furthermore, the size of exposures to subprime-linked securities of the INNER
banks was considered much bigger than the OUTER banks. On the other hand, in this period,
OUTER countries were already at levels closely linked to their domestic banks’ CDS spreads, i.e.
public imbalances and high debt burdens were priced in for the latter group, thus these spreads
adjusted less.
Concentrating on the point estimates of the responses at day 1, i.e. Figure 2 (a) and (b), two im-
portant results can be emphasized. Firstly, one can see how bank bailouts impact the risk transfer
mechanism and secondly that INNER and OUTER groups can be distinguished in the short run as
well. Related to the change in the risk transfer mechanism, Figure 2 (a) reveals that the sovereign
CDS series are more sensitive to a banking sector shock, while the sensitivity of the banks to its
own shock remains of similar magnitude. Only the responses of AIB and BOI on the dimension
of the state-responses seem to stay on approximately the same level, while their impact on them-
selves decreases. Thus, the risk transfer from banks to governments seems to be most evident in
Ireland. In the case of a country shock (Figure 2 (b)) we ﬁnd an increase of the sensitivity in both
dimensions. Countries as well as banks suffer stronger from a government shock. In the period
during/after bank bailouts, responses after one day, of which almost all are signiﬁcantly different
from zero, can be clustered into INNER and OUTER.
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Figure 2: Responses at Day 1 after the Shock
Note: Responses of both variables of the bivariate systems are plotted (i.e. bank response (y-axis) vs. country response (x-axis) and
country response (y-axis) vs. bank response (x-axis)). For example,  ABN is located at (1,.1) indicating that a shock (at day 0, before
government interventions) in the CDS series of ABN, that leads to a 1% increase of the ABN spread, impacts the Dutch CDS spread
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Figure 3: Effects of a Sovereign Shock on Bank spreads: After Government Interventions.
Note: The “Average” line represents the mean of the bank responses from a shock in the seven sovereign CDS spreads.
vention era. Figure 3 depicts the entire impulse response series of the selected banks to a shock
in the government sector. Sorting banks by the effect in the long-run, which were shown to be
signiﬁcant in all cases, we obtain the following ranking (from lowest effect to the highest): Société
Générale (SG), ABN Amro Bank (ABN), Deutsche Bank (DB), BNP Paribas (BNP), Commerzbank
(COM), ING Group (ING), Banco Santander (BS), Unicredito (UCR), Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argen-
taria (BBVA), Banco Comercial Portugues (BCP), Banco Espirito Santo (BES), Allied Irish Banks
(AIB), Bank of Ireland (BOI), Intesa Sanpaolo (ISP). Long-run responses of the banks from the
same country are clustered. The only exception are the Italian banks, in which case ISP is more
sensitive to a sovereign shock than UCR (148% compared to 75%). While SG is impacted only
14by 35% of the initial shock, the strongest three impacts range from 128% to 148%. ISP and Irish
banks respond the most to a sovereign shock. They are followed by the Portuguese and then the
Spanish banks, where UCR ranks between BBVA and BS. At the bottom of this ranking are the
Dutch, German, and French banks.
4.2 Speciﬁc Country Analysis
In this subsection the results for three countries are presented, i.e. Germany, Ireland, and Italy.
These have been selected out of the group of countries considered as they differ strongly in their
total commitment to the ﬁnancial sector relative to their 2008 GDP. Ireland represents the country
with the highest engagement and Italy with the lowest. Germany can be argued to range in the
middle of these measures.
4.2.1 Germany
In the case of Germany we analyze the bivariate setups of the German (DE) sovereign CDS spread
in relation to the CDS spread of Commerzbank (COM) and the CDS spread of Deutsche Bank (DB)
respectively. The results for the tests on Granger-causality are depicted in Table 3, cointegration
relations in Table 4, and impulse responses in Table 5 which are presented in Appendix A.14
Cointegration and Granger-Causality Analysis
For the entire period before government interventions (i.e. Stage 1+2) we ﬁnd evidence for a
stable long-run equilibrium relationship between the German CDS spread and both bank CDS
series. The hypothesis that both estimated -coefﬁcients for the banks are equal to  1 cannot be




 cdsDB;t   2:087
(0:471)
  ect; 15
where ect refers to the value of the long-run relation at time t and standard errors are provided
in parentheses. As variables are measured in logs, the  coefﬁcients may be interpreted as elas-
ticities, yielding to a bank-sovereign CDS equation. This relation implies, neglecting the rest of
the estimated dynamics in the model, that a 1% increase in the CDS spread of DB leads to a 1%
increase in the CDS spread of DE. For COM the same interpretation applies.
The -coefﬁcients in the relations of DB and COM with DE suggest that the bank spreads do
not adjust to any deviations from the long-run equilibrium, while the German CDS spread adjusts
with a rate of ^ DE =  0:122 and ^ DE =  0:108 in the relation with DB and COM respectively. A
formal test conﬁrms this result as cdsDB;t and cdsCOM;t are tested to be weakly exogenous, which
14Test results and the graph of the German sovereign CDS together with the German banks’ CDS time series are
presented in Appendix C.2.
15The cointegration graph is provided in Appendix C.2, Figure 9.
15leads to the argument that DB and COM provide the stochastic trend in the cointegration relations.
Tests for Granger-causality indicate that only COM Granger-causes DE on a 1% signiﬁcance level
in the period before state interventions.
After bank aid schemes the long-run relations change. Firstly we do not ﬁnd a stable long-
run relation for DE-COM for the entire post-intervention period, but only in Stage 5. Compared
with the pre-intervention results, we ﬁnd equal values for the -coefﬁcients, implying the same
elasticities as mentioned above. However the constant changes from 1:24 (before) to insigniﬁcant
(after) yielding the interpretation that the gap between the two CDS series vanished. In contrast
we do ﬁnd a cointegration relation for DE and DB for the entire post-intervention period.
The relation for COM and DE in Stage 5 yields the conclusion that COM is weakly exogenous
and DE adjusts with a rate of ^ DE =  0:045, which is close to the -value from the period be-
fore interventions. In the second cointegration relation, that takes together all three stages after
the bailout scheme, we ﬁnd DE to move the equilibrium in the direction of its development (as
DE’s  and  coefﬁcients are both positive). Granger-causality tests indicate further for the period






















































































Figure 4: Generalized Impulse Responses for Germany: (Solid) Before, (Dotted) During & After Gvt. Interv.
Note: Solid lines: responses before government interventions (bold) and the 95% bootstrapped conﬁdence interval (thin). Dotted lines:
responses during and after government interventions (bold) and the 95% bootstrapped conﬁdence interval (thin). X-axis: number of
days (after the shock). Y-axis: impact relative to one standard deviation shock of the impulse variable. [Left Panel] Upper-Left: DE
(impulse variable) - DE (response variable). Lower-Left: DE (impulse var.) - COM (response var.). Upper-Right: COM (impulse var.)
- DE (response var.). Lower-Right: COM (impulse var.) - COM (response var.). [Right Panel] Upper-Left: DE (impulse var.) - DE
(response var.). Lower-Left: DE (impulse var.) - DB (response var.). Upper-Right: DB (impulse var.) - DE (response var.). Lower-Right:
DB (impulse var.) - DB (response var.).
The results from the impulse response are depicted in Figure 4. The analysis before government
interventions refers to the VECM setup; only in the period after we use a VAR framework for
examining the relationship between DE and COM. In all graphs the three solid lines represent
16the impulse responses before interventions, where the light ones refer to the 95% bootstrapped
conﬁdence interval. The bold dotted line describes the responses during and after rescue schemes
and the light dotted lines the bootstrapped conﬁdence bands. Firstly, we observe that the pattern
of the left panel resembles strongly the pattern depicted in the right panel. In the upper-right
corner of each panel the effects of a shock from the bank CDS spread to German CDS are plotted.
Before interventions (solid) a banking sector shock impacts permanently the government CDS
series, while in the period after (dotted) there is only a temporary effect.
In the case of a government shock to the banking sector we notice that DB (right panel) and
COM (left panel) are only affected in the very short-run (t  3) before interventions. In the period
after bank bailouts, we ﬁnd that both series react permanently to a shock stemming from the
sovereign.
Additionally, the graphs show that the effects of a banking sector shock on itself are stronger
in the pre-interventions period, as they are estimated to have a permanent effect. The responses
after state interventions suggest a decrease of the impact of the latter in both cases. The shocks
from the government CDS spread on itself have a stronger impact in both bivariate setups after
interventions.
Discussion
From October 2008 until the end of May 2010, Germany provided a total support to the local
ﬁnancial sector of EUR 619.1bn or 25% of total 2008 GDP. From a total committed amount of EUR
64.8bn for capital injections, EUR 54.5bn were demanded by German banks until the end of May
2010. GermanypledgedEUR475bninformofliabilityguarantees, fromwhichlocalbanksutilized
EUR 185.8bn until the end of our time frame.
SoFFin16 granted COM an individual guarantee for issuing EUR 15bn of debt securities.17 Fur-
thermore, SoFFin participated with EUR 8.2bn in form of a silent equity holding (“silent partici-
pation”) and COM’s recapitalization by the German government amounted another EUR 10bn.18.
On the other hand, DB, the biggest German bank, resisted to state capital injections. Given the
complete recapitalization of COM and a lessened expected reliance on government guarantees,
we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant differences in the dynamics of both bank CDS series in relation with the
German sovereign CDS spread. Furthermore, our results suggest that investors anticipated the
direct support for COM as Granger-causality tests underpin that the CDS spreads of COM contain
important information for determining the German spreads. Thus, before interventions we have
evidence that the dynamics of the series differ, suggesting that the link between the CDS series of
COM and DE is more sensitive than the link between DB and DE.
COM is known to have had severe difﬁculties during the last crisis, which led SoFFin to pro-
vide extra support to this bank. The results of our empirical analysis underline that the dynamics




18These capital injections became public on 3 November 2009.
17of the two banks do not substantially differ in the post-intervention period. Assuming that this
similarity is a consequence of the extra support provided, we conclude that the rescue schemes
in the case of Germany were successful. The extra funding for COM was necessary in order to
induce a credible perception that the tail risk of the latter was absorbed by the state. We ﬁnd that
shocks of both banks have a weaker effect on themselves after the bailout schemes. However, the
result is stronger for DB. The cost for this positive aspect is a higher sensitivity of both banks to
developments in the government CDS spreads. Notably, the German spread is not inﬂuenced at a
long horizon by a banking sector shock after bailout measures are provided.
Altogether, the results highlight that the contagion emerged from the banking sector and
spilled-over to German sovereign CDS spread in the period before rescue schemes. Thus, we
ﬁnd evidence for H1. The dependence in the other direction is weaker or only existent in the very
short-run. Afterwards, future developments of the perceived default risk of all series are strongly
interwoven as suggested by the cointegration analysis and the results of the Granger-causality
tests. Furthermore, impulse responses highlight a stronger interdependency of all series, while
an unexpected change in the bank CDS series has only a temporary effect on the sovereign CDS
spread (H2a, H2b). Moreover, we ﬁnd no strong differences in the dynamics of COM and DB in
relation to changes in German CDS spreads (H3). Our results suggest that the extra support for
COM credibly transferred the default risk on the government’s balance sheet.
4.2.2 Ireland
Within the set of analyzed countries, the results for Ireland reveal most clearly the impact of gov-
ernment interventions. As the dynamics for both setups, i.e. Ireland (IR) - Allied Irish Banks (AIB)
and Ireland (IR) - Bank of Ireland (BOI), resemble strongly we report only one of them. Tests on
Granger-causalityaredepictedinTable3, cointegrationrelationsinTable4, andimpulseresponses
in Table 5 which are presented in Appendix A.19
Cointegration and Granger-Causality Analysis
The cointegration analysis uncovers a long-run relation in Stage 2, in which ^ AIB =  0:567. In-
terpreting the cointegration coefﬁcients for the period before interventions, a 1% increase in bank
CDS spreads translates into an about 0.57% gain in the Irish spread. The gap (the constant from
the cointegration equation) between the two CDS series is insigniﬁcant.
Furthermore, in the period before government interventions there is evidence that the stochas-
tic trend originates from the banking sector and impacts the sovereign CDS series. The estimated
 coefﬁcient for AIB is not signiﬁcantly different from zero and the hypothesis of weak exogeneity
for the banking sector series cannot be rejected. Thus, we conclude that the series of AIB inﬂu-
ences IR in the long-run. In the short-run, Granger-causality is not signiﬁcant in any of the two
directions.
During and after interventions the dynamics change and emphasize a different role of the Irish
19Preliminary test results and the graph of the respective time series are presented in Appendix C.3.
18CDS spread, which we argue occurs because of government interventions. The error correction
equation can be written as
cdsIR;t = 0:724
(0:105)
 cdsAIB;t + 1:116
(0:587)
  ect:20
Comparing elasticities, we now ﬁnd that ^ AIB increases to 0.724, implying that a 1% increase in
the Irish spread augments the bank spread by 1.38%.21 The gap between the two series is enlarged
and it is signiﬁcantly different from zero.
The estimated -coefﬁcients suggest that during and after interventions the Irish spread pro-
vides the stochastic trend, as a test for weak exogeneity of this series cannot be rejected. Only the
bank CDS spread adjusts to deviations from the long-run equilibrium with a rate of ^ AIB = 0:06.
The prominent role of the Irish CDS series is also emphasized in the short-run dynamics, where
we ﬁnd that the Irish CDS spread Granger-causes the CDS spread of AIB but not vice versa during
this period.
Impulse Response Analysis
The generalized impulse responses, depicted in Figure 5, underline the shift in the dependence
between the two CDS series. Firstly, the graph in the upper right corner indicates that a shock
from the banking sector permanently inﬂuences the government CDS spread before interventions,
and only temporarily (t  2) in the second period. The opposite pattern is found for a government
sector shock. In the pre-intervention period the graph in the lower left corner highlights that the
latter shock does not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the CDS spread of AIB, while there is a permanent
impact in the period during and after the rescue schemes. Moreover, the remaining two graphs
(upper left and lower right corner) suggest that there has been a change in sensitivity to a shock
fromthesamesector. Abankingshockyieldsapermanenteffectonitselfbeforeinterventionswith
a strongly decreasing impact. For the Irish spread the GIR results show an opposite development.
Whilst both deviations are permanent, the one during the second period is by far stronger.
Discussion
Not surprisingly the study of the Irish risk transfer mechanism depicts most clearly the change
in the dynamics, as Ireland (IR) represents, by far, the one with the highest total commitment to
the ﬁnancial sector relative to its GDP. Remarkably it amounts to 319% of 2008’s GDP; or put in
monetary value EUR 592bn. Up to the end of May 2010, EUR 99.8bn were required in total by
Irish banks. This amount includes EUR 19.3bn that were used as capital injections (Table 1). Both
banks in our study were recapitalized by the Irish government on the 21st of December 2008 and
approved by the European Commission on 26/03/2009 (BOI) and 12/05/2009 (AIB).22. Under
this scheme AIB and BOI were each provided EUR 3.5bn. Similar public aid structures for both
banks lead to homogeneous ﬁndings, which supports our H3.
20The cointegration graph is provided in Appendix C.3, Figure 11.
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Figure 5: Generalized Impulse Responses for Ireland: (Solid) Before, (Dotted) During & After Gvt. Interv.
Note: Upper-Left: IR (impulse variable) - IR (response variable). Lower-Left: IR (impulse var.) - AIB (response var.). Upper-Right: AIB
(impulse var.) - IR (response var.). Lower-Right: AIB (impulse var.) - AIB (response var.). Solid lines: responses before government
interventions (bold) and the 95% bootstrapped conﬁdence interval (thin). Dotted lines: responses after government interventions
(bold) and the 95% bootstrapped conﬁdence interval (thin). X-axis: number of days (after the shock). Y-axis: impact relative to one
standard deviation shock of the impulse variable. Generalized impulse responses for BOI behave similarly to those of AIB.
The magnitude of the rescue scheme has been the highest (relative to GDP) among the coun-
tries analyzed, which led to the clearest results for the risk-transfer mechanism. The impact of a
banking sector shock on itself decreases substantially after measures are provided. Furthermore,
there is a signiﬁcant impact on the government spreads only in the short-run. The ﬂip side of the
coin is the strong inﬂuence of a government sector shock on the banks after the rescue schemes,
which ampliﬁed the serious issues of the Irish ﬁnancial sector as the sovereign debt problems
emerged.
Combiningtheresultsfromthetwoanalyses, weﬁndstrongevidenceforH1, H2a, H2b. Before
bailout programs the data shows that the channel through which risk is spread into the market
originates from the banking sector rather than from the government. In the period after gov-
ernment interventions, the private-to-public risk transfer mechanism puts more weight on the
developments of the government CDS spread. As the government took over the tail risk from the
banks, the development of the Irish CDS series plays an increasingly important role. Only in the
very short-run changes in banks’ CDS spreads impact on the government series during and after
the state interventions. The effects of a banking sector shock on itself have weakened, underpin-
ning the success of the Irish bailout schemes.
4.2.3 Italy
The main cointegration relations between Italy and the selected domestic banks (Intesa San Paolo
(ISP) and Unicredito (UCR)) are presented in Table 4. Table 3 presents the ﬁndings for Granger-
20causality tests and Table 5 the generalized impulse responses.23
Cointegration and Granger-Causality Analysis
In the period preceding the government support for the Italian banking industry (i.e. Stage 1+2),
we ﬁnd that the banks’ and sovereign CDS series are tied together in a long-run equilibrium.
Interpreting the  coefﬁcients, neglecting the remaining dynamics of the system, we argue that
in the long-run a 1% increase in a ISP’s (UCR’s) CDS spread leads to a 1.4%(1.5%) increase in
the CDS series of Italy. The gaps (i.e. the constants of the cointegration relations) between the
two CDS series is in both setups estimated to be signiﬁcantly different from zero. The speed of
adjustment, reﬂected by the estimated -coefﬁcients, is faster for the CDS spreads of banks, i.e.
j^ ITj = 0:012 < 0:020 = j^ ISPj and j^ ITj = 0:010 < 0:014 = j^ UCRj. Regarding the short-run
dynamics results reveal that Italy is Granger-caused by the developments in ISP’s and UCR’s CDS
spread in Stage 1+2, consistent with our assumption that the information from the ﬁnancial sector
was systemically important.
During and after the Italian bank bailout program for the ﬁnancial sector the dynamics be-
tween the sovereign and banks’ CDS spreads change. Firstly, UCR is found to be in a stable
long-run equilibrium with the Italian government CDS series only during Stage 5. In this setup
the estimated -coefﬁcients imply that a 1% increase in government’s spreads induces an upward
adjustment of UCR’s CDS of 0.78%. The error correction mechanism of IT-ISP for the entire post-
intervention period is as follows:
cdsIT;t = 0:864
(0:087)
 cdsISP;t + 0:922
(0:385)
  ect:24
A marginal change of the Italian CDS series by 1% leads to an adjustment of cdsISP by 1.16%.
Elasticities of both banks cannot be compared as they refer to different stages of our sample. The
constant is signiﬁcantly different from zero in both setups.
In the period after government interventions, the loading coefﬁcients indicate that Italy pro-
vides the stochastic trend, as the CDS series of the latter is tested to be weakly exogenous. This
result implies that, although the Italian CDS spread does not adjust to deviations from the long-
run equilibrium, the banks’ CDS spreads react to these changes. In contrast with the results of the
previous period, after state interventions the Italian CDS spread Granger-causes both bank CDS
spreads but not vice versa.
Impulse Response Analysis
The graph in the upper right corner of each panel depicts the effect of a banking shock to the
sovereign CDS series. The solid line emphasizes that risk permanently spreads to the government
CDS series before interventions. After interventions, a shock originating from ISP (left panel)
leads to a permanent shift in the government CDS spread, while the shock of UCR (right panel)
shifts the Italian CDS series stronger but only temporarily (t  12). These ﬁndings support our
23Preliminary test results and the graph of the respective time series are presented in Appendix C.4.
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Figure 6: Generalized Impulse Responses for Italy: (Solid) Before, (Dotted) During & After Gvt. Interv.
Note: [Left Panel] Upper-Left: IT (impulse variable) - IT (response variable). Lower-Left: IT (impulse var.) - ISP (response var.).
Upper-Right: ISP (impulse var.) - IT (response var.). Lower-Right: ISP (impulse var.) - ISP (response var.). [Right Panel] Upper-
Left: IT (impulse var.) - IT (response var.). Lower-Left: IT (impulse var.) - UCR (response var.). Upper-Right: UCR (impulse var.) -
IT (response var.). Lower-Right: UCR (impulse var.) - UCR (response var.). Solid lines: responses before government interventions
(bold) and the 95% bootstrapped conﬁdence interval (thin). Dotted lines: responses after government interventions (bold) and the 95%
bootstrapped conﬁdence interval (thin). X-axis: number of days (after the shock). Y-axis: impact relative to one standard deviation
shock of the impulse variable.
H2a and H3. In contrast, in the period before interventions (solid lines) the effects of a shock from
the government sector (the lower-left graph in each panel) are signiﬁcant in the short-run for both
banks. During/after interventions (dotted lines) the impact is stronger and permanent, in line
with our H2b. The pattern of a bank shock on the series themselves is very similar in the two
periods (the lower-right corner in each panel). A government shock on itself is stronger in the
period afterwards for both setups.
Discussion
Italy has one of the highest debt burdens25 among European Union countries. This fact deter-
mined the Italian government to pledge in total EUR 62bn, that represents slightly above 4% of
the 2008 GDP. This ratio is the lowest among the analyzed countries in this paper. Capital injec-
tions accounted for EUR 4.1bn from a committed amount of EUR 12bn. Italy also promised to
support its domestic banks with an asset purchase scheme worth EUR 50bn. On 20 March 2009,
ISP started the procedure to obtain EUR 4bn in state aid for recapitalization26. On the other hand,
UCR which is the biggest Italian bank did not request any capital injection from the state of Italy.
The increased future possibility of a government aid for ISP is reﬂected in our GIR analysis: the
25Italy’s public debt was estimated around 105% of GDP in 2008.
26http://www.group.intesasanpaolo.com/scriptIsir0/si09/contentData/view/content-ref?
id=CNT-04-000000003F8D4
According to this document, on 29 September 2009 ISP decided not to participate anymore in the Italian aid program
for the banking sector, so-called “the Tremonti Bonds” program, but to issue debt to private investors.
22CDS series of ISP became more sensitive to unexpected changes in the Italian spread than the
CDS series of UCR. This result and the cointegration relation between IT and ISP (in Stage 4+5+6)
provide evidence for our third hypothesis (H3).
In the case of ISP, we ﬁnd that the rescue measures taken by the Italian government were not
sufﬁcient in absorbing the tail risk from the latter bank. A shock of the bank on itself has even a
stronger effect after bailout schemes. The other ﬁnding underpins the idea that investors believed
that difﬁculties of ISP would spread to the government sector. In the case of UCR, we detect a
similar pattern like in other countries, since the effect of a banking sector shock on itself slightly
decreases.
Before Lehman Brothers’ default, the systemic banking crisis spreads to the sovereign market,
which can be supported by the results from Granger-causality analysis, or the permanent effect of
a banking sector shock inthe context of the GIR analysis. However, movements of IT’s CDSspread
have an effect on the bank spreads as well, which contradicts partially our H1. After state inter-
ventions, this relation becomes more pronounced as now IT Granger-causes both banks, provides
the stochastic trend in the cointegration relations, and government shocks cause strong deviations
inthebanks’CDSseries. Nonetheless, banksstillinﬂuencethegovernmentCDSseries, albeitUCR
only temporarily. Bailout schemes seem not to limit the effects of a banking sector shock on itself
as the intensity of the impact is almost the same as in the period before government interventions.
On the other hand, sovereign spreads are more sensitive to shocks after bank support schemes.
5 Conclusions
The recent ﬁnancial crisis led governments to tailor aid programs for ﬁnancial institutions. The
magnitude and dimensions were unique in European history. A series of bank failures would
threaten the functioning of the whole economy as important ﬁnancial institutions incorporate a
systemic component. Hence, governments, besides central banks, took crucial steps in the attempt
torescuetheﬁnancialsystem. Byarguingthatgovernmentbailoutprogramsmarkedanimportant
event for investors, we derive our hypotheses about how the relations are expected to change.
First, we hypothesize that the increase in default risk prior to interventions originates mainly from
the ﬁnancial sector. After bailout programs are set up by European governments, we argue that
the sensitivity of the sovereign default risk to ﬁnancial sector shocks increases due to the private-
to-public risk transfer. Moreover, the default risk of the banking sector is asserted to be inﬂuenced
strongly by the government sector. How the future participation of a bank in the rescue schemes is
perceived by market stakeholders should affect its CDS sensitivity to changes in sovereign credit
risk. Finally, we argue that important determinants for the changes in linkages are country-speciﬁc
bailout characteristics.
As stated in our ﬁrst hypothesis, before government interventions, sovereign credit risk is
strongly impacted by the movements in bank CDS spreads, while changes in the sovereign CDS
spreads have a weak impact on both bank and sovereign CDS markets. Regarding H1, our ﬁnd-
23ings provide evidence in the case of FR, DE, IR, NL, and SP but not in IT and PT. Portugal’s and
Italy’s default risk seem to carry an important role in the development of their local banks’ default
risk even before the Lehman Brothers event.
For the second set of hypotheses (H2a, H2b), i.e. during and after government interventions,
we can conclude homogeneously that changes in the sovereign CDS spreads contribute perma-
nently to the ﬁnancial sector CDS spreads. On the other hand, changes in banks’ risk of default
are found to affect the sovereign CDS spreads only transitorily. Relative to the period before,
changes in banks’ risk of default impact stronger in the short-run (i.e. at day 0 and at day 1) in all
countries, while for most countries the inﬂuence becomes insigniﬁcant in the long-run (i.e. after
22 days); exceptions are IT, SP, and PT.
Countries with similar state aid (i.e. FR, IR, SP, and PT) for both analyzed banks show an equal
bankCDSsensitivitytothechangesinsovereigncreditrisk. BanksinGermany(DBandCOM)and
Italy (ISP and UCR) were differently involved in the rescue schemes, but we ﬁnd heterogeneous
linkages between Italian banks’ and sovereign CDS spreads. Our results suggest that the extra
aid provided to COM has been successful in absorbing the default risk while the high probability
of future government aid for ISP strongly links the default risk of the latter to the development
of the Italian CDS spread and ampliﬁes its sensitivity to shocks in both, banking and sovereign
sector. Furthermore, in the case of Ireland our results indicate that bailout schemes led to the
desired results, in the sense that the default risk is clearly transferred from the ﬁnancial sector to
the government.
Lastly, the cross-country analysis reveals heterogeneity in the impact of bank support pro-
grams. On the one hand, the effects of a sovereign shock to banks from the same country are
closely linked, on the other hand the effects of a sovereign shock to banks across countries can be
clustered in INNER (FR, DE, NL) and OUTER (IR, IT, PT, SP).
Relating our results to future policy, it is vital to note that the effectiveness of bank bailouts
strongly depends on the health of the host country and, thus, the credibility of the rescue scheme.
Furthermore, we highlight, in line with previous research, elevated ﬁnancing costs for countries
with contingent liabilities to the ﬁnancial sector and a higher volatility in sovereign yield spreads.
Thus, in assessing the total cost of bank bailouts, governments need to include extra interest pay-
ments due to augmented spreads.
With respect to future research, applying the same methodology in the analysis of credit risk
interdependence of European states, one could shed light on the dynamics of the public-to-public
risk transfer mechanism in the Eurozone. Drawing a comparison between the private-to-public
and public-to-public transfer mechanisms, policy makers would gain important insights on how
INNER sovereign CDSs are affected by the risk transfer from the OUTER group.
24References
ACHARYA, V., I. DRECHSLER AND P. SCHNABL, “A Pyrrhic Victory? - Bank Bailouts and
Sovereign Credit Risk,” NBER Working Paper Series (2011).
ATTINASI, M. G., C. D. CHECHERITA AND C. NICKEL, “What Explains the Surge in Euro Area
Sovereign Spreads During the Financial Crisis of 2007-09?,” ECB Working Paper (2009).
BERNDT, A. AND I. OBREJA, “Decomposing European CDS Returns,” Review of Finance 14 (2010),
189–233.
BIS, 79th Annual Report (Basel: Bank for International Settlement, 2009).
———, Quarterly Review (Basel: Bank for International Settlement, December 2008).
COLLIN-DUFRESNE, P., R. GOLDSTEIN AND J. MARTIN, “The Determinants of Credit Spread
Changes,” Journal of Finance 56 (2001), 2177 – 2207.
DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT, A. AND H. HUIZINGA, “Are banks too big to fail or too big to save? Interna-
tional evidence from equity prices and CDS spreads,” CEPR Discussion Papers 7903 (2010).
DIECKMANN, S. AND T. PLANK, “Default Risk of Advanced Economies: An Empirical Analysis
of Credit Default Swaps during the Financial Crisis,” Working Paper (2010).
DOLADO, J. J. AND H. LÜTKEPOHL, “Making Wald Tests Work for Cointegrated VAR Systems,”
Econometric Reviews 15 (1996), 396–386.
DÖTZ, N. AND C. FISCHER, “What Can EMU Countries’ Sovereign Bond Spreads Tell Us About
Market Perceptions of Default Probabilities During the Recent Financial Crises?,” Deutsche Bun-
desbank Discussion Paper (2010).
EJSING, J. AND W. LEMKE, “The Janus-Headed Salvation: Sovereign and Bank Credit Risk Premia
during 2008-2009,” Economics Letters 110 (2011), 28–31.
FONTANA, A. AND M. SCHEICHE, “An Analysis of Euro Area Sovereign CDS and Their Relation
with Government Bond,” ECB Working Paper (2010).
FORTE, S. AND J. I. PENA, “Credit Spreads: An Empirical Analysis on the Informational Content
of Stocks, Bonds, and CDS,” Journal of Banking and Finance 33 (2009), 2013–2025.
GERLACH, S., A. SCHULZ AND G. WOLFF, “Banking and Sovereign Risk in the Euro Area,”
Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper (2010).
GONÇALVES, S. AND L. KILIAN, “Bootstrapping Autoregressions with Conditional Heteroskedas-
ticity of Unknown Form,” Journal of Econometrics 123 (2004), 89–120.
25GRAY, D. F., “Modeling Financial Crises and Sovereign Risks,” Annual Review of Financial Eco-
nomics 1 (2009), 117–144.
GRAY, D. F., R. C. MERTON AND Z. BODIE, “New Framework for Measuring and Managing
Macroﬁnancial Risk and Financial Stability,” Working Paper (2008).
HANSEN, H. AND S. JOHANSEN, “Some Tests for Parameter Constancy in Cointegrated VAR-
Models,” Econometrics Journal 2 (1999), 306–333.
HANSEN, P. R. AND S. JOHANSEN, Workbook on Cointegration (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1998).
HULL, J., M. PREDESCU AND A. WHITE, “The Relationship Between Credit Default Swap
Spreads, Bond Yields, and Credit Rating Announcements,” Journal of Banking & Finance Vol.
28, No. 11 (2004), 2789–2811.
IMF, Global Financial Stability Report - Sovereigns, Funding, and Systemic Liquidity (Washington D.C.,
2010).
LÜTKEPOHL, H., New Introduction to Multiple Time Series Analysis, 2nd edition (New York:
Springer-Verlag, 2007).
NORDEN, L. AND M. WEBER, “Informational efﬁciency of credit default swap and stock markets:
The impact of credit rating announcements,” Journal of Banking & Finance Volume 28, Issue 11
(2004), Pages 2813–2843.
PESARAN, H. H. AND Y. SHIN, “Generalized Impulse Response Analysis in Linear Multivariate
Models,” Economics Letters 58 (1998), 17–29.
SCHWEIKHARD, F. AND Z. TSESMELIDAKIS, “The Impact of Government Interventions on CDS
and Equity Markets,” Working Paper (2009).
STOLZ, S. M. AND M. WEDOW, “Extraordinary Measures in Extraordinary Times - Public Mea-
sures in Support of the Financial Sector in the EU and the United States,” Deutsche Bundesbank
Discussion Paper (2010).
26A Main Results
Table 3: Results of Granger-Causality Tests for all Countries.
Country Period Independent Dependent p-value Independent Dependent p-value
France Before BNP FR 0.948 SG FR 0.662
FR BNP 0.014 FR SG 0.059
After BNP FR 0.089 SG FR 0.096
FR BNP 0.000 FR SG 0.002
Germany Before COM DE 0.005 DB DE 0.152
DE COM 0.711 DE DB 0.772
After COM DE 0.008 DB DE 0.003
DE COM 0.009 DE DB 0.004
Ireland Before AIB IR 0.499 BOI IR 0.002
IR AIB 0.333 IR BOI 0.451
After AIB IR 0.174 BOI IR 0.216
IR AIB 0.000 IR BOI 0.000
Italy Before ISP IT 0.000 UCR IT 0.002
IT ISP 0.156 IT UCR 0.536
After ISP IT 0.392 UCR IT 0.348
IT ISP 0.008 IT UCR 0.002
Netherlands Before ABN NL 0.062 ING NL 0.012
NL ABN 0.705 NL ING 0.160
After ABN NL 0.003 ING NL 0.040
NL ABN 0.059 NL ING 0.033
Portugal Before BCP PT 0.001 BES PT 0.000
PT BCP 0.909 PT BES 0.846
After BCP PT 0.871 BES PT 0.871
PT BCP 0.000 PT BES 0.000
Spain Before BBVA SP 0.001 BS SP 0.000
SP BBVA 0.024 SP BS 0.009
After BBVA SP 0.023 BS SP 0.020
SP BBVA 0.000 SP BS 0.000
Note: this table presents the Granger-causality tests for the entire period before government interventions and for the entire period
during and after bailout programs. “Before” stands for Stage 1+2 and “After” denotes Stage 4+5+6. We report the p-values of the tests.
The signiﬁcant results are emphasized in bold. The independent variable Granger-causes the dependent variable.Table 4: Results of Cointegration Analysis for all Countries.
Country Period Sov - Bk1 Sov Bk Sov Bk Constant
France Stage 1 + 2 FR - BNP -0.085 0.024 1.000 -1.059 2.031
[-3.273] [ 2.050] - [-6.997] [ 3.693]
FR - SG -0.124 0.022 1.000 -0.892 1.584
[-3.991] [ 1.864] - [-8.934] [ 4.136]
Stage 4 + 5 + 6 FR - BNP 0.018 0.018 1.000 -2.795 8.237
[ 3.582] [ 3.154] - [-5.636] [ 3.889]
FR - SG 0.017 0.015 1.000 -3.821 13.769
[ 3.712] [ 3.136] - [-5.614] [ 4.425]
Germany Stage 1 + 2 DE - COM -0.108 -0.009 1.000 -0.719 1.235
[-3.943] [-0.583] - [-5.775] [ 2.458]
DE - DB -0.122 0.009 1.000 -0.930 2.087
[-4.046] [ 0.561] - [-7.866] [ 4.428]
Stage 5 DE - COM -0.045 0.004 1.000 -1.007 1.330
[-2.211] [ 0.233] - [-1.913] [ 0.541]
Stages 4 + 5 + 6 DE - DB 0.015 0.011 1.000 -3.432 12.382
[ 3.442] [ 3.068] - [-5.082] [ 3.944]
Ireland Stage 2 IR - AIB -0.278 0.008 1.000 -0.567 -0.520
[-3.826] [ 0.171] - [-5.432] [-1.032]
IR - BOI -0.475 -0.043 1.000 -0.581 -0.349
[-5.170] [-0.655] - [-10.122] [-1.212]
Stage 4 + 5 + 6 IR - AIB 0.014 0.060 1.000 -0.724 -1.116
[ 1.012] [ 4.582] - [-6.905] [-1.903]
IR - BOI -0.002 0.096 1.000 -0.694 -1.292
[-0.086] [ 5.414] - [-10.794] [-3.584]
Italy Stage 1 + 2 IT- ISP -0.012 0.020 1.000 -1.404 2.003
[-2.282] [ 2.078] - [-6.927] [ 2.706]
IT - UCR -0.010 0.014 1.000 -1.502 2.647
[-2.110] [ 1.767] - [-5.845] [ 2.658]
Stage 5 IT - UCR 0.021 0.097 1.000 -1.280 1.462
[ 0.761] [ 3.318] - [-9.331] [ 2.247]
Stage 4 + 5 + 6 IT - ISP 0.003 0.066 1.000 -0.864 -0.922
[ 0.162] [ 3.167] - [-9.881] [-2.393]
Netherlands Stage 1 + 2 NL - ABN -0.097 0.002 1.000 -0.829 1.416
[-3.865] [ 0.146] - [-8.708] [ 3.734]
NL - ING -0.152 -0.009 1.000 -0.741 1.013
[-4.763] [-0.410] [-13.565] [ 4.787]
Stage 6 NL - ABN -0.017 0.038 1.000 -1.596 4.158
[-0.944] [ 2.929] - [-5.938] [ 3.243]
Stage 4 + 5 NL - ING 0.007 0.042 1.000 -1.572 3.125
[ 0.427] [ 3.353] - [-7.475] [ 3.220]
Portugal Stage 2 PT - BCP -0.031 0.128 1.000 -0.986 0.715
[-1.030] [ 2.313] - [-8.592] [ 1.443]
PT - BES -0.151 0.072 1.000 -0.789 0.101
[-2.916] [ 0.682] - [-15.128] [ 0.420]
Stage 4 + 5 + 6 PT - BCP 0.021 0.037 1.000 -0.793 -0.701
[ 1.808] [ 3.687] [-4.811] [-0.892]
PT - BES - - - - -
Spain Stage 1 + 2 SP - BBVA -0.019 0.023 1.000 -1.631 3.658
[-1.693] [ 2.975] - [-7.714] [ 4.404]
SP - BS -0.022 0.023 1.000 -1.619 3.632
[-1.931] [ 2.871] - [-7.873] [ 4.488]
Stage 4 + 5 + 6 SP - BBVA 0.032 0.061 1.000 -0.985 -0.009
[ 1.927] [ 3.756] - [-5.796] [-0.012]
SP - BS 0.043 0.072 1.000 -1.106 0.527
[ 2.555] [ 4.258] - [-7.215] [ 0.743]
Note: this table presents the cointegration relationships which passed the stability test. Subperiods are only included if the longer
period did not pass the stability test (see Subsection Econometric Methodology). Coefﬁcients are labeled in reference to (2). -
coefﬁcients describe the long-run relationship between banks and sovereign log-CDS spreads. The loading coefﬁcients  measure
the speed of adjustment with which a particular CDS, adjusts to the long-run relationship. In case that Sov is signiﬁcant and has an
opposite sign to Sov it means that the Sovereign adjusts back to the long-run equilibrium deﬁned by 0yt = 0, whenever 0yt 6= 0.
Whenever one of the -coefﬁcients is not signiﬁcant, it means that the respective variable can be argued to provide the stochastic
trend that determines the long-run relation and it is not adjusting at all to the long-run equilibrium. Whenever one  coefﬁcient is
signiﬁcant but with the same sign as the respective  parameter, the variable moves the entire equilibrium. t-statistics are reported in
square brackets.Table 5: Generalized Impulse Responses
Impulse Response Before Gvt. Interventions1 Remark During/After Gvt. Interventions2 Remark
Days Days
0 1 5 22 0 1 5 22
FR FR FR 1.000 0.657 0.579 0.328 1.000 1.203 1.186 0.923
BNP 0.046n 0.120 0.150 0.228 0.565 0.755 0.731 0.483
BNP BNP 1.000 1.006 0.942 0.835 1.000 1.052 0.891 0.290n
FR 0.230n 0.204n 0.418 0.764 0.452 0.584 0.416 -0.227n
FR FR 1.000 0.638 0.495 0.217 1.000 1.201 1.114 0.790
SG 0.030n 0.080n 0.125n 0.192n 0.499 0.691 0.642 0.348
SG SG 1.000 1.121 1.083 1.004 1.000 1.041 0.843 0.206n
FR 0.202n 0.246n 0.502 0.840 0.520 0.626 0.383 -0.389n
DE DE DE 1.000 0.780 0.474 0.157 1.000 1.132 1.072 0.587 V AR
COM 0.088 0.125 0.101n 0.040n 0.425 0.592 0.627 0.550 V AR
COM COM 1.000 1.091 1.088 1.171 1.000 1.060 1.004 0.580 V AR
DE 0.285n 0.356 0.285n 0.675 0.435 0.608 0.441 -0.254n V AR
DE DE 1.000 0.778 0.461 0.201n 1.000 1.140 1.129 0.889
DB 0.071 0.103 0.125n 0.146n 0.433 0.615 0.611 0.412
DB DB 1.000 1.092 1.117 1.094 1.000 1.156 1.034 0.428n
DE 0.267n 0.453 0.450 0.898 0.569 0.766 0.603 -0.127n
IR IR IR 1.000 0.539 0.526 0.397 V AR 1.000 1.266 1.123 1.270
AIB 0.122n 0.184n 0.181n 0.195n V AR 0.251 0.512 0.769 1.276
AIB AIB 1.000 1.168 1.172 0.755 V AR 1.000 0.953 1.063 0.676
IR 0.266n 0.263n 0.331 0.524 V AR 0.291 0.385 0.221n 0.282n
IR IR 1.000 0.529 0.500 0.397 V AR 1.000 1.268 1.116 1.250
BOI 0.115n 0.194 0.211n 0.222n V AR 0.212 0.508 0.677 1.410
BOI BOI 1.000 1.088 1.142 0.803 V AR 1.000 0.831 0.807 0.459n
IR 0.216n 0.400 0.365 0.431 V AR 0.220 0.222n 0.134n 0.259n
IT IT IT 1.000 1.031 0.981 0.966 1.000 1.275 1.378 1.379
ISP 0.498 0.350n 0.519n 0.619n 0.760 1.021 1.226 1.477
ISP ISP 1.000 1.074 1.122 0.729 1.000 1.179 1.156 0.960
IT 0.152 0.316 0.359 0.482 0.570 0.708 0.751 0.752
IT IT 1.000 1.043 0.923 0.921 1.000 1.259 1.262 0.851 V AR
UCR 0.537 0.471n 0.542n 0.573n 0.696 0.892 0.936 0.746 V AR
UCR UCR 1.000 1.064 1.125 0.785 1.000 1.083 0.992 0.539 V AR
IT 0.197 0.332 0.352 0.475 0.598 0.712 0.632 0.205n V AR
NL NL NL 1.000 0.658 0.469 0.204n 1.000 1.143 1.095 0.744 V AR
ABN 0.047n 0.093n 0.094n 0.073n 0.347 0.468 0.473 0.364 V AR
ABN ABN 1.000 1.003 1.132 1.173 1.000 1.111 1.084 0.836 V AR
NL 0.104 0.095 0.328 0.730 0.408 0.594 0.506 0.016n V AR
NL NL 1.000 0.680 0.434 0.160n 1.000 1.152 1.165 1.012 V AR
ING 0.109n 0.171 0.184n 0.136n 0.438 0.585 0.623 0.587 V AR
ING ING 1.000 0.962 1.075 1.135 1.000 1.123 1.011 0.539 V AR
NL 0.233n 0.135n 0.400 0.759 0.606 0.785 0.723 0.368n V AR
PT PT PT 1.000 0.982 0.949 0.806 V AR 1.000 1.264 0.990 1.170
BCP 0.342 0.387 0.406 0.424 V AR 0.535 0.785 0.809 1.056
BCP BCP 1.000 1.104 1.022 0.713 V AR 1.000 1.151 1.105 1.002
PT 0.227 0.358 0.396 0.450 V AR 0.724 0.897 0.675 0.653
PT PT 1.000 0.980 0.941 0.791 V AR 1.000 1.259 1.306 1.079 V AR
BES 0.295 0.325 0.353 0.402n V AR 0.542 0.804 0.941 1.000 V AR
BES BES 1.000 1.141 1.066 0.750 V AR 1.000 1.250 1.298 1.098 V AR
PT 0.207 0.371 0.421 0.483 V AR 0.794 0.975 0.954 0.599n V AR
SP SP SP 1.000 0.554 0.527 0.482 1.000 1.202 0.953 1.012
BBVA 0.061n 0.128n -0.067n 0.172n 0.648 0.874 0.682 0.806
BBVA BBVA 1.000 1.083 1.018 0.595 1.000 1.172 0.804 0.586
SP 0.133n 0.175n 0.605 0.511 0.651 0.812 0.537 0.398
SP SP 1.000 0.559 0.552 0.486 1.000 1.188 0.897 0.950
BS 0.069n 0.146n -0.053n 0.168n 0.663 0.893 0.628 0.739
BS BS 1.000 1.085 0.999 0.573 1.000 1.155 0.690 0.405
SP 0.142n 0.172n 0.648 0.511 0.652 0.808 0.418 0.226n
Avg. SOV SOV 1.000 0.743 0.629 0.465 1.000 1.210 1.127 0.994
BK 0.174 0.206 0.205 0.256 0.501 0.714 0.741 0.804
BK BK 1.000 1.077 1.079 0.865 1.000 1.094 0.985 0.615
SOV 0.205 0.277 0.419 0.609 0.535 0.677 0.528 0.197
Note: Each impulse-variable has an effect on itself and the second variable of the bivariate system. A unit shock in the structural
error leads to one standard deviation (in %) increase in the level of the impulse-variable. This effect is normalized to 1. The GIR of the
second response-variable represent the percentage change of the levels given the normalized impulse. n denotes insigniﬁcant effects
by considering bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence intervals with 2000 replications. 1 denotes Stage 1+2 and 2 denotes Stage 4+5+6. We
report contemporaneous responses (Days = 0) and effects after 1 day, 5 days (after one week), and 22 days (after one month). V AR
means that we use a VAR in levels for obtaining the GIR. This is done when tests and/or cointegration relation checks do not indicate
an equilibrium relation for entire Stage 1+2 or Stage 4+5+6. In “Avg.” section we provide the mean impulse responses from a shock
in sovereign CDS spreads (SOV) and from a shock in bank CDS spreads (BK).B Further Issues on Methodology
VEC-Analysis - Selection of Sub-stages
The selection of sub-stages for the study of the long-run relations is carried out following the
subsequent steps: if tests (see below) do not provide evidence for cointegration relations for a
certain stage we consider sub-periods. Also if stability of a cointegration space is rejected we
consider a ﬁner grid for the time periods. For investigating this, we consider recursively estimated
eigenvalues as proposed by Hansen and Johansen (1999). Cointegration results are only reported
for the stages that pass the stability test using the 1% critical value as a decision boundary. If there
is no evidence for a (stable) cointegration relation on the ﬁner grid as well, we report none for the
entire stage before or during/after government interventions.
Pre-Analysis of the Data, Model Speciﬁcation, and Estimation
Firstly, we apply the standard unit root (stationarity) testing procedures, i.e. the Augmented-
Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP), and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test,
to the respective time series in each sub-sample.27 All of the latter include an intercept because
we disregard the possibility of a zero mean or trend stationary process. The latter process is not
considered as it is economically unreasonable to assume that CDS series rise perpetually. We do
not analyze systems of CDS series in a vector error correction model (VECM) if there is evidence
that one or both series are stationary as in this case they cannot share a joint stochastic trend.
For detecting a common stochastic trend, this study considers on the one hand Engle-Granger
ADF test and on the other hand Johansen’s trace and maximum eigenvalue tests. The latter tests
focus only on the setup with a restricted constant, as argued before, any deterministic trend in the
variables or cointegration relation is economically unjustiﬁed. When a common stochastic trend
is detected by one of the previous tests and stability of the cointegration space is not rejected,
we model the series in a VECM framework. If not, we proceed as described above. In ﬁnalizing
our exact speciﬁcations of the models we determine the optimal lag order p by, on the one hand,
minimizing one of the common information criteria28 and on the other taking care of remaining
serial correlation in the residuals.29 The VECM is estimated by Johansen’s maximum likelihood
procedure and the VAR model via ordinary least squares.
Interpretation of Long-Run Relations in a VECM
The loading coefﬁcients, , measure the speed of adjustment with which a particular CDS ad-
justs to the long-run relationship. The adjustment forces start acting, whenever the long-run re-
lation (deﬁned by 0yt 1 = 0, where yt 1 = (cdsSov;t 1; cdsBk;t 1)0 ) is out of equilibrium, i.e.
27Results are available upon request from the authors.
28Aikaike information criterion, Hannan Quinn criterion, Schwarz criterion, and ﬁnal prediction error
29When applicable, we also look at the plots of the cointegration relations in order to check whether these can be
argued to be stable. The plot is expected to a show a time series that ﬂuctuates nicely around some mean
30if 0yt 1 6= 0. In case that Sov is signiﬁcant and has an opposite sign to Sov (i.e. in our setup
Sov < 0) it means that the “Sovereign” is driven by the error correction mechanism. Or put differ-
ently, that it adjusts back to the long-run equilibrium deﬁned by 0yt 1 = 0, whenever 0yt 1 6= 0.
Equivalently, when Bk is signiﬁcant and has an opposite sign to Bk, it shows the speed of ad-
justment of the “Bank” to the equilibrium. With both -coefﬁcients being signiﬁcant and having
opposite signs to their respective -coefﬁcients, the variables are said to be in a real cointegration
relationship; both series are taking part in the error correction mechanism. Whenever one of the
-coefﬁcients is not signiﬁcant, it means that the respective variable can be argued to provide the
stochastic trend that determines the long-run relation. This can be formally tested using a Likeli-
hood Ratio test through a zero restriction on this parameter. If the restriction cannot be rejected,
the variable of the respective  coefﬁcient is called weakly exogenous. Furthermore, it is not adjust-
ing at all in case that the variables are not in long-run equilibrium, 0yt 1 6= 0. Whenever one 
coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant but with the same sign as the respective  parameter, the variable is said
not to be part of the error correction mechanism as the forces in the model do not attract both series
back to equilibrium. Series in this setup can only deﬁne a long-run relation if the variable that is
in a formal error correction relation adjusts faster to the new equilibrium than the other one. One
can think of this phenomenon in a way that the variable which is not part of the error correction
mechanism moves the entire equilibrium (i.e. when the variable increases in value the long-run
equilibrium will be established with both series achieving a higher value). In the literature the
term overshooting is used to describe this occurrence.30
30For a discussion of a model with overshooting please refer to Hansen and Johansen (1998).
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Figure 7: France: CDS Level Series
Table 6: France: Bivariate Cointegration Tests
Period Variables Lags Trace Statistic Max Eigenvalue Engle-Granger Test
r = 0 r = 1 r = 0 r = 1
Stage 1 FR - BNP 0 0.021 0.212 0.031 0.212 -2.406
FR - SG 0 0.006 0.119 0.012 0.119 -4.446
Stage 2 FR - BNP *
FR - SG 1 0.038 0.332 0.040 0.332 -5.701
Stage 1 + 2 FR - BNP 1 0.017 0.109 0.045 0.109 -3.102
FR - SG 1 0.005 0.147 0.010 0.147 -4.455
Stage 4 FR - BNP 6 0.119 0.130 0.296 0.130 -1.507
FR - SG 5 0.764 0.779 0.706 0.779 -1.663
Stage 5 FR - BNP 2 0.321 0.290 0.477 0.290 -2.260
FR - SG 8 0.062 0.124 0.158 0.124 -3.101
Stage 6 FR - BNP 1 0.611 0.583 0.631 0.583 -2.033
FR - SG 1 0.507 0.504 0.554 0.504 -1.573
Stage 4 + 5 FR - BNP 1 0.282 0.735 0.192 0.735 -1.163
FR - SG 1 0.295 0.944 0.142 0.944 -2.458
Stage 5 + 6 FR - BNP 1 0.211 0.447 0.216 0.447 -2.535
FR - SG 1 0.105 0.297 0.138 0.297 -2.053
Stage 4 + 5 + 6 FR - BNP 1 0.057 0.313 0.067 0.313 -2.230
FR - SG 1 0.072 0.514 0.054 0.514 -2.250
Note: Trace and Max Eigenvalue are the Johansen tests statistics (with a restricted constant). p-values are reported. The respective null
hypothesis is denoted by r = f0;1g, where e.g. r = 1 denotes one cointegration relation. * signiﬁes that at least one of the series is
stationary. For the Engle-Granger test the ADF test statistic is reported; critical values at 5% and 10% are -3.37 and -3.07 respectively.
32C.2 Germany
Table 7: Germany: Bivariate Cointegration Tests
Period Variables Lags Trace Statistic Max Eigenvalue Engle-Granger Test
r = 0 r = 1 r = 0 r = 1
Stage 1 DE - COM 0 0.044 0.171 0.086 0.171 -3.696
DE - DB 3 0.113 0.177 0.226 0.177 -4.024
Stage 2 DE - COM *
DE - DB *
Stage 1 + 2 DE - COM 3 0.014 0.062 0.057 0.062 -4.441
DE - DB 3 0.005 0.048 0.027 0.048 -5.273
Stage 4 DE - COM 1 0.413 0.663 0.350 0.663 -1.012
DE - DB 1 0.064 0.331 0.071 0.331 -1.596
Stage 5 DE - COM 1 0.164 0.496 0.146 0.496 -2.983
DE - DB 7 0.0471 0.117 0.124 0.117 -1.778
Stage 6 DE - COM 1 0.688 0.529 0.763 0.529 -1.368
DE - DB 1 0.724 0.682 0.711 0.682 -0.900
Stage 4 + 5 DE - COM 1 0.0421 0.2814 0.052 0.2814 -1.485
DE - DB *
Stage 5 + 6 DE - COM *
DE - DB *
Stage 4 + 5 +6 DE - COM 1 0.0063 0.1166 0.0145 0.1166 -1.774
DE - DB 1 0.0692 0.2769 0.0919 0.2769 -2.088
Note: Trace and Max Eigenvalue are the Johansen tests statistics (with a restricted constant). p-values are reported. The respective null
hypothesis is denoted by r = f0;1g, where e.g. r = 1 denotes one cointegration relation. * signiﬁes that at least one of the series is
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Figure 9: Cointegration Graph of Germany and Commerzbank (Before Government Interventions)
33C.3 Ireland
Table 8: Ireland: Bivariate Cointegration Tests
Period Variables Lags Trace Statistic Max Eigenvalue Engle-Granger Test
r = 0 r = 1 r = 0 r = 1
Stage 1 IR - AIB 2 0.429 0.620 0.389 0.620 -1.361
IR - BOI 2 0.390 0.601 0.354 0.601 -1.325
Stage 2 IR - AIB 1 0.232 0.999 0.080 0.999 -2.577
IR - BOI 1 0.010 0.997 0.002 0.997 -3.376
Stage 1 + 2 IR - AIB 2 0.323 0.354 0.421 0.354 -2.099
IR - BOI 2 0.436 0.306 0.628 0.306 -2.155
Stage 4 IR - AIB 0 0.016 0.233 0.021 0.233 -1.806
IR - BOI 1 0.260 0.330 0.349 0.330 -1.981
Stage 5 IR - AIB 1 0.227 0.183 0.445 0.183 -1.630
IR - BOI 1 0.269 0.151 0.579 0.151 -2.149
Stage 6 IR - AIB 4 0.049 0.679 0.024 0.679 -1.918
IR - BOI 4 0.177 0.786 0.098 0.786 -2.900
Stage 4 + 5 IR - AIB 1 0.005 0.129 0.011 0.129 -1.948
IR - BOI 1 0.027 0.393 0.023 0.393 -1.892
Stage 5 + 6 IR - AIB 9 0.003 0.122 0.005 0.122 -3.080
IR - BOI 9 0.001 0.117 0.002 0.117 -3.202
Stage 4 + 5 + 6 IR - AIB 9 0.001 0.057 0.006 0.057 -2.446
IR - BOI 9 0.000 0.164 0.000 0.164 -3.055
Note: Trace and Max Eigenvalue are the Johansen tests statistics (with a restricted constant). p-values are reported. The respective null
hypothesis is denoted by r = f0;1g, where e.g. r = 1 denotes one cointegration relation. * signiﬁes that at least one of the series is
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Figure 11: Cointegration Graph of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks (During and After Government Interven-
tions)
34C.4 Italy
Table 9: Italy: Bivariate Cointegration Tests
Period Variables Lags Trace Statistic Max Eigenvalue Engle-Granger Test
r = 0 r = 1 r = 0 r = 1
Stage 1 IT - ISP 3 0.107 0.130 0.267 0.130 -1.948
IT - UCR 3 0.140 0.180 0.278 0.180 -1.538
Stage 2 IT - ISP 1 0.089 0.919 0.032 0.919 -2.574
IT - UCR 1 0.195 0.936 0.083 0.936 -1.797
Stage 1 + 2 IT - ISP 4 0.052 0.131 0.125 0.131 -2.313
IT - UCR 3 0.083 0.108 0.236 0.108 -1.883
Stage 4 IT - ISP 1 0.761 0.561 0.829 0.561 -1.931
IT - UCR 1 0.946 0.898 0.910 0.898 -1.696
Stage 5 IT - ISP 2 0.091 0.125 0.231 0.125 -2.334
IT - UCR 2 0.044 0.143 0.098 0.143 -2.140
Stage 6 IT - ISP 4 0.248 0.389 0.293 0.389 -3.125
IT - UCR 1 0.821 0.530 0.908 0.530 -1.762
Stage 4 + 5 IT - ISP 3 0.158 0.803 0.082 0.803 -2.181
IT - UCR 1 0.590 0.584 0.605 0.584 -1.554
Stage 5 + 6 IT - ISP 4 0.042 0.768 0.017 0.768 -2.846
IT - UCR *
Stage 4 + 5 + 6 IT - ISP 1 0.059 0.514 0.042 0.514 -3.450
IT - UCR 1 0.284 0.256 0.453 0.256 -1.893
Note: Trace and Max Eigenvalue are the Johansen tests statistics (with a restricted constant). p-values are reported. The respective null
hypothesis is denoted by r = f0;1g, where e.g. r = 1 denotes one cointegration relation. * signiﬁes that at least one of the series is
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Figure 13: Cointegration Graph of Italy and Intesa San Paolo (During and After Government Interventions)
35C.5 Netherlands
Table 10: Netherlands: Bivariate Cointegration Tests
Period Variables Lags Trace Statistic Max Eigenvalue Engle-Granger Test
r = 0 r = 1 r = 0 r = 1
Stage 1 NL - ABN 0 0.029 0.099 0.085 0.099 -3.646
NL- ING 0 0.007 0.155 0.014 0.155 -4.389
Stage 2 NL - ABN *
NL- ING *
Stage 1 + 2 NL - ABN 2 0.005 0.059 0.021 0.059 -3.422
NL- ING 2 0.002 0.145 0.004 0.145 -3.918
Stage 4 NL - ABN 5 0.151 0.474 0.139 0.474 -2.419
NL- ING 0 0.932 0.761 0.940 0.761 -1.385
Stage 5 NL - ABN 1 0.106 0.085 0.349 0.085 -2.801
NL- ING 1 0.095 0.119 0.252 0.119 -2.662
Stage 6 NL - ABN 6 0.082 0.617 0.051 0.617 -3.350
NL- ING 7 0.862 0.862 0.794 0.862 -3.053
Stage 4 + 5 NL - ABN 1 0.132 0.536 0.104 0.536 -1.622
NL- ING 8 0.220 0.890 0.107 0.890 -2.243
Stage 5 + 6 NL - ABN *
NL- ING *
Stage 4 + 5 + 6 NL - ABN 1 0.624 0.848 0.487 0.848 -1.422
NL- ING 1 0.522 0.750 0.427 0.750 -2.372
Note: Trace and Max Eigenvalue are the Johansen tests statistics (with a restricted constant). p-values are reported. The respective null
hypothesis is denoted by r = f0;1g, where e.g. r = 1 denotes one cointegration relation. * signiﬁes that at least one of the series is
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Figure 14: Netherlands: CDS Level Series
36C.6 Portugal
Table 11: Portugal: Bivariate Cointegration Tests
Period Variables Lags Trace Statistic Max Eigenvalue Engle-Granger Test
r = 0 r = 1 r = 0 r = 1
Stage 1 PT - BCP 1 0.272 0.420 0.307 0.420 -1.997
PT - BES 3 0.280 0.464 0.293 0.464 -1.986
Stage 2 PT - BCP 1 0.103 0.599 0.069 0.599 -3.570
PT - BES 2 0.028 0.688 0.013 0.688 -3.374
Stage 1 + 2 PT - BCP 0 0.038 0.078 0.135 0.078 -2.647
PT - BES 0 0.038 0.093 0.119 0.093 -2.349
Stage 4 PT - BCP 6 0.291 0.717 0.206 0.717 -0.711
PT - BES 6 0.257 0.874 0.135 0.874 -1.036
Stage 5 PT - BCP 1 0.302 0.182 0.584 0.182 -2.256
PT - BES *
Stage 6 PT - BCP 1 0.057 0.596 0.034 0.596 -1.573
PT - BES 1 0.188 0.546 0.157 0.546 -1.711
Stage 4 + 5 PT - BCP 1 0.344 0.411 0.408 0.411 -2.074
PT - BES 1 0.318 0.643 0.258 0.643 -0.837
Stage 5 + 6 PT - BCP 1 0.054 0.652 0.029 0.652 -1.458
PT - BES 1 0.349 0.659 0.283 0.659 -1.724
Stage 4 + 5 + 6 PT - BCP 1 0.049 0.472 0.037 0.472 -2.104
PT - BES 1 0.378 0.571 0.355 0.571 -1.769
Note: Trace and Max Eigenvalue are the Johansen tests statistics (with a restricted constant). p-values are reported. The respective null
hypothesis is denoted by r = f0;1g, where e.g. r = 1 denotes one cointegration relation. * signiﬁes that at least one of the series is
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Figure 15: Portugal: CDS Level Series
37C.7 Spain
Table 12: Spain: Bivariate Cointegration Tests
Period Variables Lags Trace Statistic Max Eigenvalue Engle-Granger Test
r = 0 r = 1 r = 0 r = 1
Stage 1 SP - BBVA 1 0.130 0.148 0.296 0.148 -2.712
SP - BS 1 0.086 0.146 0.196 0.146 -2.860
Stage 2 SP - BBVA 1 0.017 0.468 0.011 0.468 -6.240
SP - BS 2 0.020 0.578 0.011 0.578 -6.905
Stage 1 + 2 SP - BBVA 1 0.013 0.102 0.036 0.102 -3.851
SP - BS 1 0.006 0.090 0.018 0.090 -3.420
Stage 4 SP - BBVA 1 0.503 0.569 0.506 0.569 -1.395
SP - BS 2 0.026 0.136 0.058 0.136 -2.000
Stage 5 SP - BBVA 1 0.507 0.407 0.628 0.407 -1.828
SP - BS 1 0.545 0.441 0.651 0.441 -2.348
Stage 6 SP - BBVA 4 0.778 0.535 0.862 0.535 -2.008
SP - BS 4 0.740 0.561 0.804 0.561 -2.108
Stage 4 + 5 SP - BBVA 1 0.300 0.416 0.345 0.416 -1.589
SP - BS 2 0.080 0.243 0.121 0.243 -1.987
Stage 5 + 6 SP - BBVA 1 0.606 0.563 0.640 0.563 -2.088
SP - BS 4 0.487 0.927 0.299 0.927 -2.012
Stage 4 + 5 + 6 SP - BBVA 11 0.078 0.459 0.065 0.459 -2.427
SP - BS 1 0.066 0.184 0.124 0.184 -2.619
Note: Trace and Max Eigenvalue are the Johansen tests statistics (with a restricted constant). p-values are reported. The respective null
hypothesis is denoted by r = f0;1g, where e.g. r = 1 denotes one cointegration relation. * signiﬁes that at least one of the series is
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Figure 16: Spain: CDS Level Series
38